RECENT CASES
ACCOUNT STATED-RETAINING ACCOUNT RENDERED WITHOUT OBJECTION-

In Minnesota, where a debtor retained an account rendered him by a creditor
for an unreasonable time without objection, it was held that such retention was
evidence of assent by the debtor to the balance as rendered, and an admission of
its correctness from which the law implies a promise to pay the sum stated therein
to be due; it is, therefore, an account stated. Western Newspaper Union v.
Segerstrom, 136, N. W. Rep. 752 (Minn., 1912).
The principal case is in accord with the weight of authority. Sherman v.
Sherman, 2 Vein. 276 (1692); Willis v. Jernegan, 2 Atk. 251 (I741); Anding v.
Levy, 57 Miss. (1879); Fitzgerald v. First National Bank, 114 Fed. 474 (Neb.,
1902). The rule that a debtor, by retaining an account rendered for an unreasonable time without objection, was presumed to have assented to it and it thereby
became an account stated, arose out of the customs and practices of merchants,
and was originally adopted in England by Courts of Chancery as applicable to
merchants only. Sherman v. Sherman, 2 Vern. 276 (1692). It was, however,
early applied in the United States in cases at law. Bainbridge v. Wilcox, I
Baldw. (U. S.) 536 (1832).

In some states, the Courts have refused to extend the rule beyond controversies between merchants. Brown v. Vandyke, 8 N. J. Eq. 795 (1853); Reffner
v. Hewitt, 7 W. Va. 585 (1874). With the enlarged needs of business, however,
the majority of states have extended it to all classes of business men. Towsley
y. Denison, 5 Barb. 490 (N. Y., 1866); McCord v. Manson, I7 Ill. App. n18
(1885). As in the principal case, the retention is merely regarded as evidence
of an account stated which is rebuttable. Burst v. Jackson, 1o Barb. 219 (N. Y.,
185o). It is a matter of fact for the jury to decide whether the retention by the
debtor was for a reasonable time or not. Darby v. Lastrapes, 28 La. Ann. 6o5
(1876). The account as rendered must, however, be unambiguous and clearly
indicate the nature and extent of the plaintiff's demand upon the defendant.
Manon Co. v. Carrerras, 26 Mo. App. 229 (1887). The person to whom the
account is sent must, of course, be a debtor of the sender; he is not liable for the
debts of another of which an account is sent to him by mistake. Daytona Co.
v. Bond, 47 Fla. 136 (i9o4); Allen & Co. v. Hotel Co. 88 N. Y. S. 944 (19o4).
AmENDMENT OF PLEADINGs-ACTIoN AGAINST AN EXECUToR-Suit was
brought again~t an executor for his testator's negligence. After the Statute of
Limitations had run, the Court refused to allow an amendment, which made
the person, described as executor, defendant individually as the sole devisee
under the will of the decedent. It was held that where an amendment may
involve in personal liability one who was not made a party originally, it should
not be permitted if objected to. Bender v. Penfield, 83 AtI. Rep. 585 (Pa.
1912).

After the Statute of Limitations has run, a new action would be.unavailing. Hence an amendment which brings in new parties or changes the capacity of those involved will be disallowed. LeBar v. R. R. Co., 67 Atl. 413
(Pa., 1907); King v. Avery, 37 Ala. 169 (186i). It has been manyt imes decided
that a new cause of action cannot be introduced, or new parties brought in,
or new subject matter presented, or a vital and material defect in the pleadings corrected after the Statute of Limitations has become a bar. Grier v. Assurance Co., 183 Pa. 334 (1898); Trego v. Lewis, 58 Pa. 463 (1868); Kaul v.
Lawrence, 73 Pa. 410 (1873); Wilkinson v. N. E. Borough, 215 Pa. 486 (19o6).
The fact that the amendment happens, as in the principal case, to introduce as a party one who is the legal representative of the estate originally complained against, is a matter of no consequence. Rights of action in different
capacities even though in the same individual cannot be mixed and interchanged.
Garman v. Glass, 46 Atl. Rep. 923 (Pa., igoo).
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But where the Statute of Limitations has not run, an amendment substituting or adding a party will usually be allowed. 'Wilson v. First Church,
56 Ga. 554 (1876); Patton v. Pittsburgh Co., 96 Pa. 169 (188o); Wood v.
Lane, 84 Mich. 521 (1891). In a few cases where the Statute of Limitations
was not involved, such amendments have been held inadmissible. Miles v.
Strong, 6o Conn. 393 (1891); Baron v. Walker, 80 Ga. 121 (1887).
CoNampAcTs-MurruALI

-ENFoRcEmENT-The

defendant made a written

offer of a certain piece of land, complying with the Statute of Frauds, which
offer was orally accepted by the plaintiff; whereupon the defendant refused to
perform on the *ground of lack of mutuality of obligation, insomuch as the acceptance was verbal and hence not binding on the plaintiff. Held: where a
valid, written option to sell real estate is orally accepted, the agreement becomes mutual and may be specifically enforced notwithstanding the defense
of lack of mutuality. Fox v. Hawkins, 135 N. Y. Supp. 245 (1912).
It is a general principle that mutuality of obligation is required as a condition to the right of specific performance. There is, however, an exception,
which, while not entirely without contradiction, is almost as well established as
the general principle itself; this exception is that specific performance may be
granted at the instance of a party not originally bound by a contract within the
Statute of Frauds because he did not sign the same, against another party who
did sign it, Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 489 (N. Y. x817); Miller v. Cameron,
45 N. J. Eq. 95 (1889); Smith's Appeal, 69 Pa. 474 (1871); Austin v. Wacks,
30 Minn. 335 (1883); Corson v. Mubrany, 49 Pa. 88 (1865).
The reason generally given for the exception is that by resorting to a suit
for specific performance, the party who did not sign adopts the agreement and
renders it obligatory upon himself. This exception is, of course, a relaxation of
the general principle requiring mutuality of obligation as a condition of specific
performance; but the tendency of the cases is to regard the principle as satisfied
if there is a mutuality of obligation at the time the relief.is sought, and not to
require such mutuality, from the beginning.
Chancellor Kent, in Clason v. Bailey, said that he thought that the weight
of argument was against the exception, but concluded that the exception was
too well established to be questioned.
A few cases have held that, where the party seeking specific performance of a
contract within the Statute of Frauds was not originally bound because he did
not sign the tontract, he is not entitled to its specific performance inequity
against the party who did sign. Lipscomb v. Watrous, 3 App. D. C. I (1894);
Durall v. Myers, 2 Md. Ch. 401 (1850); Kane v. Luckman, 13I Fed. 6o9 (1904).

These cases, though not without the support of logic, are clearly against the great
weight of authority.
CONTRACTS-NDUM PACTum-Two minors, respective sons of the plaintiff

and the defendant, were arrested for stealing money from the plaintiff. To procure their release, the plaintiff paid the costs, relying upon the promise of the
defendant to reimburse him one half the costs and also one half the sum stolen.
Subsequently, the defendant paid the plaintiff his share of the costs but refused
to pay the remainder. The Court denied the plaintiff recovery on the ground
that the defendant's promise was nudum pactum inasmuch as the defendant
was urider no legal obligation to pay the debt of his son. Wilkins v. Barnes, 75
S. E. Rep. 361 (Ga., 1912).
This case is flatly contra to the well-established doctrine of consideration,
which "may consist either in some right, intent, profit or benefit accruing to one
party or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, supplied or
undertaken by the other," Currie v. Misa, L. R. Io Excheq. 153, 162 (Eng., 1875).
It is not necessary that the promisor receive any benefit. Henry v. Durrell, 7
Neb. 691 (1904), affirmed, 128 N. W. Rep. 528 (Neb. 191o); for any detriment suffered by the promisee at the request of the promisor is sufficient to bind
the promise, no matter how small the detriment or injury be. Violet v. Patton,
9 U. S. 142 (18o9); Houck v. Frisbee, 66 Mo. App. I6 (1896). Or if the promisee
does anything legal, upon the promisor's request, which he is not bound to do.
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Street v. Gait, 136 App. Div. 724 (N. Y. 191o). It has been held to be valuable
consideration if the promisee gave up the use of tobacco for a certain period.
Talbot v. Stenmon's Admr. io Ky. Law Rep. 33 (1888). Change of residence by
the promisee, Bigelow v. Bigelow, 95 Me. 17 (i9oi); extension of the time of payment, Reigel v. Ormsby, ixi Iowa, 1o (igoo); giving up a letter at the promisor's
request, Wilkinson v. Olivera, i Bingham's New Cases, 490 (Eng., 1835); a promise for a promise in a bilateral contract, Stanborough v. Warner, 4 Leonard, 3
(Eng., 1589). A benefit to a third party is sufficient consideration, so the promise of one brother to care for a third brother, imbecile, whom neither was under
legal obligation to support, is valid consideration for the promise of the second

brother to pay for such board. Harlan v. Harlan,

102

Iowa,

701 (1897).

The fact that the plaintiff in reality only suffered a detriment of one-half
the costs upon a promise to be reimbursed of that sum plus one-half the amount
stolen is not material, for "when a benefit results to the promisor or to another
at his request, or where the loss or inconvenience is sustained at the instance of
the promisor, the latter is bound to perform whether the consideration is sufficient
or not." Newton v. Carson, 8o Ky. 309 (I882). And the adequacy or inadequacy
of the amount paid by the promisee or its disproportion to the sum promised does
not affect the question of the kind of consideration, since the adequacy is merely
an element of good faith and has no bearing upon whether the consideration is
valuable or good. Lindley v. Blumberg, 9 Pacific Rep. 894 (Colo., 19o8).
CONTRACTs-PARTIs--BENEFIT oF THiRD PARTY-The lessee of the assignee of the mortgagor of certain properties in Pennsylvania covenanted in
his lease to pay as rent a certain sum of money each year to a designated Trust
Company on behalf of the bondholders of the mortgagor. In an action by the
Trust Company against the lessee for unpaid rent, recovery was denied because
the Trust Company was a stranger to both the contract and the consideration
and the promisee owed no legal or equitable obligation to the plaintiff. The
lease having been made after the mortgage, the mortgagee can neither distrain
nor sue for the rent because there is no privity of contract or estate between the
mortgagee and the tenant. There was no novation. Merchants' Union Trust
Co. v. New Philadelphia Graphite Co., 83 At. 520 (Del., 1912).
This case follows the strict common law doctrine that no one can sue upon
a contract to which he is not a party. Pollock on Contracts, 222. According to
the strict conception of contractual liability, privity created by act of the parties themselves is required to permit one to sue another in contract. In England today, therefore, one not a party to a contract cannot sue upon it although
made for his express benefit. Gandy v. Gandy, 54 L. J. Ch. 1154 (1885). His
remed is inequity upon the trust.
This rule has been broken into in most American jurisdictions. Lawrence v.
Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859), Berry v. Doremus, 3o N. J. L. 399 (1863), Delp v.
Brewing Co., 123 Pa. 42 (1888) and the early Massachusetts cases, Arnold v.
Lyman, 17 Mass. 400 (1821) and Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush. 337 (I85i), are all
cases in which recovery was had by the beneficiary in assumpsit. In all these
cases, there was a transfer of money or property by the promisee to the promisor
for the plaintiff's benefit and in all of them the old common law action of debt or
of account would have lain. The promisor is variously treated as 'tin effect a
trustee. "Adams v. Kuehn, i19 Pa. 76 (1888); as a "forwarding agent," Baxter v. Camp, 71 Conn. 245 (1898) and Lilly v. Hays, 5 Ad. and E. 548 (Eng.,
1836); and as a plain debtor, Berry v. Doremus, supra. The common law rule
and this exception are well stated in Cooper v. Walther, 44 Pa. Super. 303 (I9io).
The principal case does not fall within the exception; it is rather one of a
line of cases qualifying the exception. To enable a stranger to a contract to sue
-upon it when there has not been a transfer of property to the promisor for the
,express benefit of the stranger, it must be shown (i) that the contract was made
for his express benefit, Freeman v. Pa. R. R., 173 Pa. 274 (i896), and (2) that the
,promisee is under some legal or equitable obligation to the beneficiary. Vulcan
Iron Works v. Pittsburgh Eastern Co., r44 N. Y. App. 82 (1911).
In certain other American jurisdictions although privity between the parties
is recognized as essential to enable one to sue in contract, it is held that privity
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between the beneficiary and the promisor is established by operation of law as
soon as promisor and promisee have agreed. Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, II6 Wis.
517 (i9o3). Neither knowledge of, nor assent to, the agreement by the beneficiary is essential. Bay v. Williams, 112 Il1.91 (884); nor must any consideration
move from the beneficiary. Rogers v. Gosnel, 58 Mo. 589 (1875).
FORGERY-FILLING UP BLANK CnrEcK-Where two men were partners in a
joint s eculative adventure, and one procured the indorsement of the other on a
check
n blank
for payment
their
joint
losses,
promising
not to
fill itamount,
up for
more than
a certain
amount,ofbut
later
filling
it up
for a much
larger
not
guilty
of
forgery;
at
most
it
was
a
breach
of
confidence.
Ex
panre
which was, however, less than their joint indebtedne, it was held that Geisler,
he was
It
is
well
settled
that
when
an
instrument
is
executed
in
blank,
it
is
forgery
196 Fed. Rep. 168 (1912).
to
fill in the blank so as to make it different than was
by the maker.
Rex v. Hart, 7 Car. & P. 652 (1836); State v. Kroeger, 47intended
Mo. 552 (i871). Accordingly, where one who is authorized to fill up checks signed in blank with
certain amounts and to use them in the principal's business for a particular pur-

pose, fills them up for a larger amount and appropriates the money, he is guilty
of forgery. People v. Dickie, 62 Hun, 400 (N. Y., 189i); Regina v. Wilson, 2
Car. & K. 527 (1847); Rex v. Hart, 7 Car. & P. 652 (1836). This rule is put on
the ground that by filling up the check with a larger amount, the rights of the
drawer are prejudiced and an extra obligation is imposed upon him. For forgery
is the fraudulent.making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of the rights
of another. Com. v. Bargar, 2 Law T. (N. S.) 37 (Pa., 188o).
In the principal case, it is said that this rule is confined only to cases of employer and employee, and of principal and agent, but not to a case where the
relationship is that of two partners jointly liable for losses.
INNKEzPER-LBIITY-WHo Ann GuEsTs-In the 'case of Pettit v.
Thomas, 148 S. W. Rep. 5ox (Ark., I912), appellant was a hotel proprietor, who
entertained families as his principal patrons, but received all transient guests
who came. The appellee came to the hotel for the benefit of her health, expecting to remain an indefinite length of time, and although there was an agreement as to the weekly rate, there was none as to the time of stay. Appellee
sued for loss of luggage by fire. The court sustained the finding that the appellant was an iinkeeper within the meaning of the law. Walling v. Potter,
35 Conn. i85 (1868); Bonner v. Willborn, 7 Ga. 307 (1849). The term "inn"
is synonymous with "tavern" and "hotel," but not with "boarding house,"
:'restaurant" and "lodging house." Pinkerton v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 596
(1867); People v. Jones, 54 Barb. 3ii (N. Y. 1863). Also a Pullman carcompany in so far as it renders services similar in kind to an innkeeper's is subject to
the same liability. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lowe, 28 Nebr. Rep. 239 (1889).
Being an innkeeper, the appellant was an insurer of the property of the guest
committed to his care, and liable for any loss thereof not arising from the act
of God, the public enemy, or the neglect or fraud of the owner. Mason v.
Thompson, 9 Pick. 28o (Mass., 183o); Richmond v. Smith, 8 B. & C., 9 (Eng.
1828);.Quinton v. Courtney, 2 N. C. (i Hayw.) 40 (1794); Libley v. Aldrich,
33 N. H. 553 (1856). If they are stolen or burned without the fault of either
guest or landlord, the latter must pay for them, Schultz v. Wall, 134 Pa. 263
(189o); Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163 (x865); Fuller v. Coates, I8 Ohio St.
343 (1868); Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. i 18 (1874). A few jurisdictions restrict
the liability for uch loss to cases where the innkeeper has been guilty of negligence
or default.
Metcalfv. v.Bonney,
Hess, 1430IlL.
129 (1852);
McDaniels v. Robinson,
26
Vt. 316
(1854); Cutler
Mich.
259 (1874).

The distinction between a boarding house and an inn is, that in the former
the guest is under an express contract for a certain time at a certain rate; while
in the latter he is entertained from day to day under an implied contract. Willard v. Reinhardt, 2 E. D. Smith, 148 (N. Y., 853); BealU v. Beck, 3 Cranch
C. C. 666 (U.- S., 1829). It is a question of fact for the jury to determine from
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the contract. Berkshire Woolens Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417 (Mass., 1851);
Neal v. Wilcox, 49 N. C. 146 (1856); Fay v. Pacific Improvement Co., 93 Cal.
In the present case, the appellate court affirmed the instructions
253 (1892).
embodying the foregoing holdings, under which the jury found that the appellee
was a "guest," in view of the fact that her stay at the hotel was to be indefinite,
and to be ended at her pleasure. But, under substantially similar facts, where
the stay was to be "until such time as the appellee's wife should be benefited
in health," upon a finding of the jury that the appellee was a "boarder," the
appellate court, in Moore v. Long Beach Development Co., 87 Cal. 483 (189i),
refused to disturb the verdict.
INSANE PERSONS-LIABILITY OF A LUNATIc FOR THE TORT OF AN EMPLOYEE OF THE GuAmmIAN-The plaintiff, while driving on the highway, was

injured through the negligence of a chauffeur employed for a lunatic by his
guardian. Neither the lunatic nor the guardian was being carried in the car
at the time, though evidence was given that the chauffeur was then about the
general business of the lunatic's establishment. The court ruled, Gillett v.
Shaw, 83 Atl. Rep. 394 (Md., 1912), that the lunatic was not liable, because
(i) It was not his personal tort or done by his direction; (2) not being capable
of appointing an agent, he is not liable for the acts of one claimed to be his
agent, and so neither his property nor estate can be held; (3) the tort was that
of the employee of the guardian; and (4) the tort of the employe or servant of
the guardian of a lunatic cannot bind the lunatic either personally, or render
his property liable.
The decision is a restriction, if not a departure, from the earlier adjudged
cases, ruling that an insane person is civilly liable to answer in damages for his
torts, although being incapable of criminal intent, he is not liable to indictment
and punishment. Ward v. Weaver, Hob. 134 (Eng., 1646); Hale P. C. 15, 16.
Action is said to lie
Lancaster Bank v. Moore, 78 Penna. St. 407, 412 (875).
for any tort. Cross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581 (187O); Jewett v. Colby, 66 N. H. 399
(189o); intent being not material, Krom v. Schoomaker, 3 Barb. 647 (N. Y.,
1848); his estate being liable for his tortious acts, McIntyre v. Scholty, 121
I1. 665 (1887). One pertinent limitation on a lunatic's tort liability is recognized in actions for libel and slander where the fact of the well known insanity
of the defendant may have prevented any heed being given. Yeates v. Reed,
4 Blackf. 463 (Ind., 1838); Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 225 (1812).
As to negligence, other than that personal to the defendant himself, Morain
v. Devlin, 132 Mass. 87 (1882) holds that a lunatic is liable for the injury suffered by a stranger upon defective premises owned by the lunatic, but
under the control of the guardian, and not in the exclusive occupancy and control of a tenaht. The underlying questions of responsibility in this case, and
the recent one considered above, are identical, but the decisions contra.
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-DUTY TO CHILD TRESPASSER-When a child of 23
months trespasses upon a private siding, the owner owes no affirmative obligation to anticipate its presence and in absence of wanton and wilful negligence is
not liable for any injury to it. Martin v. Hughes Creek Coal Co., 75 S. E. Rep.
5o0 (W. Va. 1912).
This case merely follows the general rule that an owner of premises is not
bound to keep them safe or in any particular condition for the benefit of
trespassing children. Balls v. Middleboro Town & Land Co., 24 Ky. Law Rep.
114 (1902); Peninsular Trust Co. v. City of Grand Rapids, 131 Mich. 571 (19o2);
Hughes v. Boston & Maine R. R., 71 N. H. 279 (i9o2). The rule in the "TurnTable" cases does not apply, as there is no liability for failure to fence a freight
yard. Barney v. R. R., 126 Mo. 372 (1894), afortiorisingle spur on private premises.
The Court distinguished this case from those of public service railroads and
property. "A private siding leading merely from private property to the line
of a public railroad, over which the public can have no rights is not a public
utility. This is plainly true where the premises of the individual benefited either
directly adjoin the railroad, or are separated only by a few feet." Wyman: Public
Service Corporations, Vol. I, Section 226 and cases cited; Pittsburgh W. & K.
R. R. Company v. Ben Wood Iron Works, 31 W. Va. 710 (1888).
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The rule in West Virginia casting the affirmative duty upon railroad employees operating trains to watch out for infant trespassers, Gunn v. Railroad,
42 W. Va. 676 (1896), 36 L. R. A. 575, is contra to the general rule that employees

of a railroad company operating one of its trains are not required to anticipate
the presence of child trespassers upop its tracks or property and the duty of

using ordinary care and diligence does not arise until his presence becomes known,
Southern Railway Co. v. Chatman, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 283, 124 Ga. 1026 (19o6);
Palmer v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 34 Utah, 466 (i9o8), 36 American
and English Ann. Cases, 229 and cases cited.
The two dissenting justices relied strongly upon the rule in Smith v. R. R.,
25 Kan. 738 (1881), but that case is not in point as the siding was part of a public
service railroad.
VENuE-AcTIONS: LocAL OR TRANITORy-In a case where the plaintiff's
real property, situated in New Jersey, was negligently set on fire and damaged,
by the sparks from the defendant company's locomotive, it was held that, notwithstanding the allegation of negligence, such an action was, at common law,
an action of trespass on the case for injury to real property, and, therefore, not
maintainable in the Courts of New York. Brisbane v. Penna. R. R. Co., 98
N. E. Rep. 752 (N. Y. 1912).
The above decision is in accord with the great majority of the opinions in
this country.

Livingston v. Jefferson, i Brock.

203

(W. S. C. C. 1811); Alvin

v. Conn. River Lumber Co., i5o Mass. 56o (I89O); Cragin v. Lovell, 88 N. Y.
258 (1882); Dodge v. Colby, IO8 N. Y. 445 (1888); Peyton v. Desmond, 129
Fed. i (x9o4).

The cases contra seem to be but three: Barney v. Burstenbinder, 7 Lans.
(N. Y. 1872), and Home Ins. Co. v. Penna. R. R., Ii Hun. 182 (N. Y. 1877),
which have later been overruled in their own state; and Little v. R. R. Co., 65
Minn. 48 (1896), which is still the law in Minnesota.
By the common law of England, an action for the recovery of damages for
injury to land is local and can be brought only where the land is situated. This
is also the law in most of the States of the Union. In the leading case of Livingston v. Jefferson, supra, which has done more than any other case to mold the law
in this country, Chief Justice Marshall argued against the rule, showing it to be
merely technical, but concluded that it was so thoroughly established by authority
that he was not at liberty to disregard it. In Barney v. Burstenbinder and in
Home Ins. Co. V. R. R. Co., the Court attempted to lay down the principle that
when the gravamen of an action, for injuries to real property, is negligence, there
the action is transitory. This theory has not been recognized anywhere else
and has been overruled many times in the very state that ventured it. Justice
Mitchell, in the Minnesota case of Little v. R. R. Co.; supra, while recognizing
the trend of the authorities, nevertheless refused to be bound by them in what he
considered a mere technicality, in that the reparation is purely personal and for
d.nages; and changed the rule in Minnesota, thereby accomplishing the result
that several other states have obtained by statute. i Revised Code of Virginia
of 18ig, page 450, pp. 14; Ohio Statutes annotated, 1897, Section 5031.
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